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ABSTRACT  
We analysed European Union banks’ Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio 
determinants after Sovereign Debt Crisis. We resorted to information from the 
Bankscope database. We exported information of 137 banks from the 27 countries 
belonging to the EU, from 2011 to 2018. We performed a regression analysis, 
running several models to identify the significant variables and their impact on the 
CET1 ratio. To attest the results’ robustness, we replicate the analysis winsorizing 
the dependent variable and the variable that represents Return on Equity. We 
verified that size, risk exposure, leverage and liquidity are factors that affect CET1 
ratio and banks solvency. Additionally, we observed that the European Central 
Banks’ (ECB) asset purchase program seems to increase banks’ capacity to absorb 
potential losses, which justifies this kind of measures by the regulator.  
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RESUMO 
Neste trabalho, analisamos os determinantes do rácio Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) dos bancos da União Europeia após a Crise das Dívidas Soberanas. 
Utilizámos informação da base de dados do Bankscope. Exportámos informação de 
137 bancos dos 27 paises da UE no período de 2011 a 2018. Baseámos o nosso 
estudo numa análise de regressão, sendo que analisámos vários modelos de forma 
a analisar od determinantes e qual o seu impacto no rácio CET1. Para atestar a 
robustez dos resultados, replicámos a análise aplicando um processo winsor à 
variável dependente e à variável que representa o Return on Equity. Verificámos 
que o tamanho, a exposição ao risco, a alavancagem e a liquidez são fatores que 
afetam o rácio CET1 e consequentemente a solvabilidade do banco. 
Adicionalmente, observámos que o programa de compra de ativos por parte do 
Banco Central Europeu (BCE) aparenta aumentar a capacidade dos bancos para 
absorver as suas potencias perdas, pelo o que se justifica este tipo de ações por parte 
do regulador.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis affected the entire financial system. Regulatory 
measures were implemented as a response to the deficiencies detected. Given that 
certain European countries were facing weak economies, the financial crisis 
worsened their situation. Highly indebted countries in Europe affected the banking 
sector, leading to the European sovereign debt crisis. Bank capital ratios can detect 
banks’ incapability to absorb losses (BCBS, 2016). 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio, hereafter CET1 ratio, is an example of a bank 
capital ratio. It indicates banks’ capacity to absorb losses, which makes important 
to address its determinants. Identifying the factors that influence this capital ratio 
will allow us to use this information. According to the Basel III regulatory 
framework, this ratio should meet a minimum of 4,5% (Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2017). 
Currently, European banks have 13.8%, on average, as reported by EBF1. Still, 
due to the difficulties faced, the Single Resolution Board requires the establishment 
of Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) (KPMG 
International, 2019). This requirement represents one of the key tools to enhance 
banks’ resolvability. Banks should have on their balance sheet enough capacity to 
absorb losses. Thereby, banks are obliged to maintain minimum own funds and 
eligible liabilities to be used as a buffer to absorb losses in case of a bank failure 
and resolution. MREL requirement includes the loss absorption amount and the 
recapitalization amount of the bank. Thus, according to the banks’ risk exposure, it 
should maintain a certain amount to forearm itself in case of resolution. In this case, 
MREL ensures that the costs of a banks’ failure will be borne by its investors, 
avoiding the need for bailouts. 
Nowadays European banks are facing problems due to their low profitability, 
mainly justified by ECB’s low interest rates. The economic slowdown in Europe 
promotes the maintenance of ECB records low interest rates. Therefore, banks’ 
 
1 See https://www.ebf.eu/facts-and-figures/banking-sector-performance/ 
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profitability is affected, which makes them change their business models. European 
banks are motivated to resort to Merger and Acquisitions (M&A), to diversify their 
business overcoming low profitability. M&A avoids bankruptcy of the acquired 
bank preventing its impact on the financial system. 
According to literature, capital requirements are a determinant of the banks’ 
capital structure (Mishkin, 2000). Capital requirements work as a cushion to absorb 
unexpected losses. In case these losses exceed the buffer it could lead to bank 
failures (Berger et al., 1995). Bank failures are contagious, so bank capital should 
be a regulated item (Berger et al., 1995). Banks with weak capital buffer and weak 
capital structure are more vulnerable to spillovers (Bruyckere et al., 2013). 
Vulnerable banks are more likely to default, making investors demand higher rates 
which in turn contributes to increasing default (Lane, 2012). 
Banks’ capital adequacy level has a significant effect in contagion, which 
justifies Basel III implementation (Bruyckere et al., 2013). This regulatory 
framework strengthened bank capital requirements by increasing liquidity and 
decreasing leverage (Batista & Karmakar, 2017). Basel III calls for a minimum 
leverage ratio requirement (Gambacorta & Karmakar, 2016). This ratio was set as 
3% acting as a complement to risk-weighted capital requirement 2  (Batista & 
Karmakar, 2017). Banks’ CET1 ratio indicates its capacity to absorb potential 
losses, while leverage ratio represents the maximum loss that can be absorbed by 
banks’ equity (Gambacorta & Karmakar, 2016).  
The study aims to examine the impact of several variables on the level of banks’ 
CET1 ratio. Our research question is:  
What were the determinants of CET1 ratio in European Union banks after the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis? 
In order to address this question, we gathered annual data related to European 
Union banks from 2011 to 2018, and we analysed the impact of the independent 
variables in the CET1 ratio.   
 
2 CET1 ratio minimum requirement is a risk-weighted capital requirement 
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We found that larger banks, riskier banks and higher leverage banks have lower 
CET1 ratio. Moreover, we observed that banks with higher liquidity ratios present 
higher CET1 ratios, making them more solvents. And, the Quantitative Easing, the 
measure held by ECB to purchase financial assets appears to increase the banks’ 
capacity to absorb potential losses. 
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 embodies the literature review on 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the CET1 ratio. Focusing on the main 
causes and consequences of the crisis, and findings related to past studies on capital 
ratios. Chapter 3 describes the data and methodology used to perform the analysis. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the research. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the 
main conclusions achieved, the limitations of this research and discusses further 
studies. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section is organized by subsections. In subsection 2.1 we will start by 
making a historical framework of what triggered the European debt crisis. Then 
subsection 2.2 describes its causes and consequences. In subsection 2.3, we refer to 
crisis effects, such as contagion, spillover effects and the interdependence between 
banks and sovereigns. In subsection 2.4, we will describe some measures taken to 
mitigate the effect of the crisis. Subsection 2.5 refers to Basel III regulatory 
framework and its importance.  Subsection 2.6 references past studies related to 
determinants of capital ratios. And finally, subsection 2.6.1 highlights the main 
findings from the literature regarding capital ratios studies.   
2.1. EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS 
In 2007 the financial crisis in the United States of America affected the financial 
system around the world. The speculation around the house price masked some 
problems that were not detected in the financial system. When prices stopped 
growing the risk became clear. Subprime mortgage loans deteriorated the quality of 
the market (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). 
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Following the 2007 financial crisis, regulators became concerned about the risk 
that banks were facing. Several changes were made in regulation in order to limit 
the risk exposure and avoid the need for a possible bail-out (CGFS, 2018). Basel III 
was developed to address the deficiencies in financial regulation detected with the 
financial crisis. This regulatory framework is composed by three key principles: 
capital requirements, leverage ratio and liquidity requirements. With Basel III, 
banks are required to maintain a minimum CET1 ratio of 4,5% (Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2017). 
However, such changes in regulation were not enough to foresee the sovereign 
debt crisis. Since the end of 2009, beginning of 2010, eurozone member states faced 
a severe Sovereign Debt Crisis. Although it was originated in Greece, it spread to 
several other European countries (Missio & Watzka, 2011). Greece’s debt levels 
became unsustainable, they couldn’t repay it, and asked for help (Bruyckere et al., 
2013). In May 2010, the European countries agreed to provide Greece bilateral 
loans for an amount of 80 billion euros, to be repaid until June 2013 (Nikiforos et 
al., 2015). The International Monetary Fund also financed Greece for a total amount 
of 30 billion euros (Mink & Haan, 2013). The fear of contagion was the major 
motivation to provide financial support to Greece (Constâncio, 2012). Greece’s 
default worried investors. Investors became worried about the likelihood of EU 
bailout countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal, from a Greek default (Mink & Haan, 
2013; Gupta, 2015). 
Rating agencies downgraded several European countries due to their high debt 
levels and high government deficits, creating a loss of confidence (Missio & 
Watzka, 2011). This could lead to speculation, and if investors stop investing in 
bonds issued by other governments, then those governments could not be able to 
repay their creditors, worsening the problem. Therefore, it was created a 700bn euro 
firewall to protect other euro members from a full-blown Greek default (Gupta, 
2015). 
Before the crisis, Ireland, Greece and Spain showed signs of real convergence, 
their cumulative growth differentials increased from 20 to 45% compared to 
Germany, in 2007. This convergence was based on borrowed money and 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
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accompanied by high inflation rates (Knot & Society, 2012). Correlation between 
countries can be observed by studying contagion. Missio & Watzka (2011) found 
that Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Belgian yield spreads increase along with their 
Greek counterparts. 
This period was then characterised by an environment of accelerating debt 
levels and high government deficits. Several banks suffered capital losses and 
member states had to bail out the affected banks. 
2.2. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The financial crisis triggered several factors leading to the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis. The main causes of the crisis were: member states highly indebted 
(Gupta, 2015); high structural deficits (Bruyckere et al., 2013); and the Great 
Recession (Gupta, 2015).  
The main consequences of the Eurozone crisis were: expensive bailouts which 
increase the likelihood of sovereign default (Acharya et al., 2014); sovereign’s and 
banks’ downgrade by rating agencies (Alsakka & Gwilym, 2013); increase in 
unemployment (Lane, 2012); credit crunch (Acharya et al., 2018); and contagion 
(Mink & de Haan, 2013; Allegret et al., 2017).  
Although there are common reasons for the peripheral countries to face this 
crisis, that are mentioned above, there are additional causes behind this that varied 
from country to country. For example, in Ireland, sovereign debt arised from the 
property bubble burst (Kelly, 2009), causing problems to Irish banks, which were 
downgraded to junk status (Corbet, 2014). In Spain, the increase in private debt 
emerging from the property bubble was shifted to sovereign debt, due to 
government measures and the bailouts that banks received (Dehesa, 2012). In 
Portugal, the recessions of 2002-2003 and 2008-2009 difficult Portuguese ability to 
repay their public debt (Lourtie, 2011). 
Borrowing practices were stimulated by unusually lower interest rates and easy 
credit conditions (Fagan & Gaspar, 2007). The banks’ investment in sovereign debt 
turned them sensitive to their default. Therefore, when some countries started to 
default on parts of their debt, banks highly exposed to the sovereign risk faced a 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
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huge problem. Bruyckere et al. (2013) concluded that bank default risk related to 
country default risk increases with the banks’ increasing of debt of that country on 
its balance sheet. They also concluded that this effect is stronger when country 
default risk rises. These conclusions confirmed the increased link and 
interdependence between banks and countries which is consistent with other studies 
(Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; Acharya et al., 2018).  After the Greek crisis, highly 
indebted economies started to worry investors (Gupta, 2015). Bond investors 
demand higher rates of return when they expect that a government is likely to 
default on its part of the debt (Cochrane, 2011). The combined effect of increasing 
interest rates and the downgrade of sovereign bonds made Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain (PIIGS) unable to finance themselves (Waller et al., 2012). PIIGS 
were then obliged to request for monetary help (Cline, 2012). On the other hand, 
bailouts triggered sovereign credit risk, and weakened the financial sector (Acharya 
et al., 2014). 
Analysing the evolution of public debt, before the crisis we can observe low 
spreads on sovereign debt, which indicates that markets weren't expecting default 
risk (Lane, 2012). In 2007-2008 US risky asset prices decrease affected European 
banks which invested in such assets, speeding European stock markets collapse 
(Ali, 2012). European banks used US asset-backed securities as a source of dollar 
finance, making them highly exposed to its losses (Acharya & Schnabl, 2010). 
The global financial crisis was a confirmation for the interdependence within 
the financial system. With the 2007 financial crisis, the combined effect of domestic 
recessions, banking sector distress and decline in investors’ risk appetite, fuelled 
the conditions for a sovereign debt crisis (Lane, 2012). One of the causes of this 
crisis was the fact that there were no sanctions for countries that violated the debt-
to-GDP ratios, defined by Maastricht Criteria. Bruyckere et al. (2013) concluded 
that countries with higher public debt to GDP ratios in the crisis were more sensitive 
to domestic financial sector stress.  
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2.3. CRISIS EFFECTS 
There are several studies supporting the interdependence between banks and 
sovereign risks; and contagion from a sovereign debt crisis to banks. 
There is some evidence for the contagion of crisis. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) 
found that banks with weak capital buffer and a weak funding structure are more 
vulnerable to spillovers. They also found that at the country level the debt ratio is 
the most important driver of contagion. In their research, they found empirical 
evidence for both contagion, and an excessive correlation between banks and 
sovereign, as it was referred above. Their work supports the implementation of 
Basel III since they found that banks’ capital adequacy level has a significant effect 
on contagion. The correlation between countries can be reduced by increasing the 
Tier 1 ratio. And the degree of contagion of banks and sovereign decreases with 
lower debt ratios (Debt-to-GDP ratio). Caruana & Avdjiev (2012) also found a 
correlation between banks and sovereigns. 
Recapitalization of troubled banks using public funds can mitigate a banking 
crisis, but this action can be problematic if public debt and sovereign risk reach an 
excessive level (Acharya & Schnabl, 2010). Thus, the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
strengthened the relationship between bank and country risk.  
High exposure of sovereign debt makes a country more vulnerable to rises in 
the interest rate it pays on its debt (Corsetti & Dedola, 2011). Vulnerability 
increases the probability of default, which makes investors demanding higher 
yields, making default even more likely (Lane, 2012). 
2.4. MEASURES TAKEN 
In order to mitigate the crisis effects the following measures were taken: 
provided bailout funds, austerity measures, reducing short-term interest rates and 
EBA stress tests (Cline, 2012). 
Bailout funds were used to recapitalize banks. Some member states bailed out 
troubled banks, without a common resolution regime. These rescue operations 
increased the national debt and caused a deterioration of public finances (IMF Staff 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
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and Note, 2009). Literature refers to the need and importance of having a sound 
fiscal and banking union (see Black et al. (2016), and Bruyckere et al. (2013)). The 
monetary union of the Euro area was not accompanied by a sound banking or fiscal 
union, financial regulation and fiscal policy remain at national responsibility. Lane  
(2012) argued for the fragility of a monetary union related to the absence of a 
banking union and other buffer mechanisms at a European level. The currency 
union brought advantages but also some problems. National governments were able 
to borrow in a common currency, which triggers some free-rider problems if there 
are strong incentives to bail out a country that borrows excessively (Beetsma & 
Uhlig, 1999). With the common currency, the euro, countries couldn’t raise interest 
rates or print less currency, to decrease inflation (Lane, 2012; Waller et al., 2012). 
Therefore, they couldn’t avoid recession, leading tax revenues to fall and 
unemployment to increase (Knot, 2012; Allegret et al., 2017; Cochrane, 2011). 
Concerns increased as the crisis was developing, and measures were taken to 
mitigate its effects. ECB injected capital in troubled member states banks (De 
Bruyckere et al., 2013). Some states were rescued by sovereign bailout programs, 
represented by Troika, which is constituted by the International Monetary Fund, 
European Commission and ECB (Lourtie, 2011). At the end of 2009, the Greek 
government announced that their budget deficit was larger than it was reported, 
leading to two bailouts under Troika supervision. Portugal and Ireland also received 
rescue packages supervised by Troika (De Bruyckere et al., 2013). Raising taxes 
and lowering expenses, were measures taken by some governments that caused a 
social unrest environment (Cline, 2012). Eurozone countries had to reduce their 
spending, which could slow countries’ economic growth, as with Greece (Mink and 
de Haan, 2013). Austerity measures slowed the Greek economy: unemployment 
increased, consumer spending was cut back, and the capital needed for lending was 
reduced (Waller et al., 2012). The austerity measures were not well accepted by 
politicians, as seen by the intention to leave the EU by Greece. ECB intervened 
reducing short-term interest rates, providing extensive liquidity and entering into 
currency swap arrangements to facilitate access to dollar liquidity (Constâncio, 
2012).  
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As a consequence of this crisis, a new form of financing appeared, Eurobond 
(Knot, 2012). In December 2010, Luxembourg’s prime minister and Italy’s finance 
minister proposed the issuance of Eurobonds (Juncker and Tremonti, 2010). They 
believed that the issuance of such an instrument would restore the debt of the 
member states (Curzio, 2011; Lourtie, 2011).  The European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) was established to provide immediate financial assistance programmes for 
the member states in financial difficulty (Knot, 2012). The ESM was funded with 
700 billion euros, aiming to restore financial stability in the EU (Curzio, 2011).  
  The European Banking Authority (EBA) is one of the primary regulators of 
the EU banking industry, that aims to maintain financial stability in the banking 
sector (EBA, 2016). EBA also took measures to identify potential problems behind 
the crisis causes. It conducted sovereign stress testing exercise and required banks 
to rebuild capital plans (De Bruyckere et al., 2013). The increased volatility in debt 
markets and the contagion in the euro area were important factors of the crisis 
period (Acharya et al., 2014a). EBA annual transparency and stress tests allowed 
greater transparency in the European financial system and identified weaknesses in 
banks’ capital structures (Berger & Bouwman, 2016). Transparency tests address 
information on banks’ capital, risk-weighted assets (RWA), market and credit risk 
(Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Stress tests examine whether the 
bank would stay solvent in the event of a crisis (European Central Bank, 2010). 
2.5. BASEL III 
Basel III is an international regulatory framework, developed by the Basel 
Committee (Batista & Karmakar, 2017). It is composed by a set of measures arising 
from the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by the 2007 financial crisis 
(Batista & Karmakar, 2017). The banking sector entered the financial crisis with 
too much leverage and inadequate liquidity buffers (Bcbs, 2015). Basel III was 
implemented in order to tackle banks’ capital ratios risk sensitivity (Batista & 
Karmakar, 2017). This framework creates capital buffers, stipulates more Common 
Equity, introduces Leverage ratio, Liquidity coverage and Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(Batista and Karmakar, 2017). It strengthened bank capital requirements, increasing 
liquidity and decreasing leverage. After several revisions and adjustments, the 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
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Basel Committee achieved the most recent version in September 2012 3 . That 
document embodies the core principles for effective banking supervision. It has the 
29 principles, covering supervision powers, the need for early intervention and 
timely supervision actions, supervisory expectations of banks, and compliance with 
supervisory standards (BSB, 2012). Basel III demands a minimum leverage ratio 
requirement for banks of 3% (Batista & Karmakar, 2017). Osterberg and Thomson 
(1989); and Berger et al. (1995) emphasize the importance of legal capital 
requirements.  
Some literature supported the deficiencies of having just this capital 
requirement. The major flaw of Basel II was that risk weights applied to the various 
asset categories failed to fully reflect the underlying risk in banks’ portfolios 
(Batista & Karmakar, 2017). Vallascas & Hagendorff (2013) concluded that the 
calibration of regulatory capital requirements to portfolio risk is very weak. Basel 
II only marginally increased the risk sensitivity of capital requirements and 
introduced an asymmetric treatment of low and high-risk portfolios (Vallascas & 
Hagendorff, 2013). Basel III calls for a minimum leverage ratio requirement 
(Gambacorta & Karmakar, 2016). This ratio is defined as banks’ Tier 1 capital over 
an exposure measure independent of risk assessment, which is the main 
improvement compared with the existing risk-weighted capital requirement 
(Ingves, 2014). The leverage ratio was set at 3%, and act as a complement and a 
backstop to risk-weighted capital requirement (Batista & Karmakar, 2017)..  
The risk-weighted capital requirement indicates the capacity to absorb potential 
losses, and the leverage ratio represents the maximum loss that can be absorbed by 
equity (Gambacorta & Karmakar, 2016). The leverage ratio complements the risk-
weighted capital requirement, but the opposite is also true, in fact they both 
complement themselves (Batista & Karmakar, 2017). During a boom phase, credit 
risk is low, so banks are motivated to expand the size of their balance sheets, 
reducing risk weights (Batista & Karmakar, 2017). The extension of credit can be 
excessive when the assessment of credit weights is overoptimistic, in a period with 
low interest rates (Gambacorta & Karmakar, 2016). Then, when credit risk 
 
3 See https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm 
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materialises, bank capital act as a buffer to absorb the losses incurred (Batista & 
Karmakar, 2017). The leverage ratio counterbalances the impacts of falling risk 
weights, it is stricter constraint during booms, prevent the excessive increase in the 
size of banks’ balance sheets and, therefore, the excessive risk-taking (Batista & 
Karmakar, 2017).       
2.6. CAPITAL RATIOS 
Our objective in this paper is to study the impacts of the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis in banks’ CET1 ratio. There is some literature regarding the effect of 
the European sovereign debt crisis on bank stocks. Bank’s stocks decreased with 
the event of the crisis. Allegret, et al. (2017) concluded that rising sovereign risk of 
the three countries most affected by the crisis, decreased eurozone banks’ stock 
returns. That finding is consistent with the remaining literature concerning 
contagion and transmission of sovereign risks to banks (Allegret et al., 2017; 
Acharya et al., 2018).  
Previous literature also evaluates the effects on banks’ capital ratios. 
Regulations that demand capital buffers to mitigate the adverse effect of the crisis 
seem to affect bank behaviour (Ediz, et al., 2011). 
There are studies relating to capital decisions and covering capital requirements. 
Berger et al (1995) conclude that there are two contrary forces that determine the 
banks’ capital structure. Market capital requirement causes banks to hold capital 
against unexpected losses, increasing its capital buffers. On the other hand, the 
regulatory safety net is likely to lower bank capital. Mishkin (2000) refers that legal 
capital requirements are a determinant of the banks’ capital structure. Bank 
managers have incentives to hold less capital than what is required due to the high 
costs of holding capital. Banks hold additional capital because they are required to 
do so by regulatory authorities. Berger, et al. (1995) refer to this as “market” capital 
requirement. This capital works as a cushion to absorb unexpected losses, if these 
losses exceed the buffer it could lead to bank failures. As referred, bank failures are 
considered contagious, so bank capital should be a regulated item. Barth et al. 
(2011) proved that the Basel Committee’s regulation influence in banks’ capital 
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level is much higher than required formally. Berger et al. (2008) argue that financial 
institutions manage and adjust their capital ratios and level to their own targets, set 
quite above the minimum regulatory. 
2.6.1. CAPITAL RATIOS: MAIN FINDINGS 
One can find some studies regarding the determinants of capital ratios, a 
measure that reflects a banks’ stability. Ahmad, et al. (2008) studied the 
determinants of bank capital ratios of Malaysian banks. They found that banks’ risk-
taking is higher with increasing capital ratios, which is consistent with existent 
literature (See: Shrieves & Dahl, 1992). Shrieves & Dahl (1992) defend that a 
banks’ reduction in debt-to-asset ratio, as a response to a higher capital requirement, 
will allow that bank to achieve its desired total risk, increasing its asset risk. 
According to Ahmad, et al. (2008) there is no significant correlation between bank 
managers’ capital decisions and profitability, which is not consistent with prior 
researches (see Berger, et al. (1995) and Saunders & Wilson (2001)). This 
inconsistency might be justified because this study was carried out for a developing 
country.  Although, Klepczarek (2015) also concludes that profitability (measured 
by ROA) is negatively related to capital level.  
Brink & Arping (2009) find a negative correlation between size, asset 
structure (defined as RWA to total assets) and capital structure (defined as total 
liabilities to total assets) of a bank. Ahmad et al. (2008) and Klepczarek (2015) 
also support the finding that banks’ size is negatively correlated with capital 
adequacy. Gropp & Heider (2008) confirm the negative correlation between 
banks’ size and Tier 1 capital. 
Since we also want to study CET1 ratio impacts, we took into consideration 
some variables used in past researches. The data used and the methodology 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our objective is to address the factors that influence the CET1 ratio in banks 
within the European Union. Our research question is:  
What were the determinants of CET1 ratio in European Union banks after the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis? 
This section describes the work that was done in this thesis. It focuses on the 
data and methodology used to answer our research question. It is structured as 
follows. Section 3.1 describes the sample used and the criteria applied to select it. 
Section 3.2 presents. Section 3.3 details the independent variables. Section 3.4 
presents the model followed in this research. Subsection 3.4.1 refers to preliminary 
statistics, such as the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables 
used. And section 3.5 presents the robustness analysis.  
3.1 SAMPLE 
We collected annual data for all our variables from Bureau Van Dijk BankScope 
database from 2011 to 2018. Our analysis is based on a selected sample of 137 
banks within the EU, belonging to 27 countries.  
This sample was obtained taking into consideration firm size and location. We 
filtered the search results from the database, considering the banks’ natural 
logarithm of assets amount (bank size). From that screening, we selected the biggest 
5 from each European Union country, when applied. Note that for some countries 
it was not possible to get 5 banks.  
In our sample, we have 426 observations of the dependent variable.  
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Our goal is to address the determinants of the CET1 ratio, i.e the factors that 
affect CET1 ratio. Therefore, we consider it as the dependent variable in our model.  
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CET1 ratio refers to the coefficient between Common Equity Tier 1 Capital and 
the amount of RWAs4. It is widely used as a measurement of a banks’ core equity 
capital. It measures a banks’ capacity to withstand financial stress and remain 
solvent.  
𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU) and the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (575/2013) reflect Basel III rules on banks’ capital 
requirements. Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (575/2013) are the 
transposition of the CRD IV package. CRD IV was introduced in 2013 as a result 
of several revisions of the original banking directive adopted by the European 
Commission. In 2008 it was made the first revision (CRD II) and in 2009 the 
original banking directive was revised once more (CRD III). The financial crisis 
period was marked by banks’ vulnerability. Banks faced insufficient liquidity and 
insufficient quality and quantity of capital reserves. Aiming to overcome this issue 
CRD IV sets stronger prudential requirements for banks, requiring for sufficient 
liquidity and capital reserves. In order to keep track of this requirement, in the EU, 
the ECB establishes targets for the CET1 ratio. CET1 capital in the event of a crisis 
is the first deducted from this tier, so it is important to ensure that this ratio is above 
the required.  
EBA performs annual stress tests using the CET1 ratio, to ascertain how much 
capital banks would have left in an adverse scenario. If banks do not respect the 
regulatory minimum, regulators might overtake them or shut them down.  
We wanted to ensure residuals normality because the models used assumes it. 
To address if residuals are normally distributed, we perform a Shapiro-Wilk test. 
This test intends to check normality, its null hypothesis is that the population is 
normally distributed. Thus, if the p-value is less than the alpha level (1%, 5% or 
10%), the null hypothesis is rejected, and therefore we don’t have statistical 
evidence to confirm normality. 
 
4 Regulatory indicator used to define the minimum amount of capital that must be held by banks to reduce 
their risk of insolvency  
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Performing this test, we came out with a p-value of 0,078% (See Figure 2 in 
Appendix), so the null hypothesis is rejected. Nonetheless, Figure 1 in Appendix, 
shows that the Standardized normal probability plot fits the diagonal line. 
Additionally, in Figure 4, the kernel density graph shows the similarity with a 
normal distribution.  Therefore, this means that residuals distribution is close to 
normal.   
3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Aiming to determine the factors that influenced the CET1 ratio, we used 
independent variables already used in previous literature. In our research, we focus 
on the strength of influence of the following variables: Total equity to total 
liabilities ratio, banks’ size, Risk-Weighted Assets ratio, Return on Assets, Return 
on Equity, Ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits, and a dummy variable. 
EQTL represents the ratio of total equity to total liabilities which expresses 
bank leverage. Leverage measures how much capital comes using debt (borrowed 
funds). Low leverage leads to a high ratio of total equity to total liabilities. In 
contrast, high leverage leads to a lower total equity to total liabilities ratio. It is 
expected that when our dependent variable increases total equity to liabilities ratio 
also increases. High leverage banks would face difficulties raising new equity, and 
therefore, would hold less equity than low-leverage banks (Ahmad et al., 2008). 
Thus, high leverage (low total equity to liabilities ratio) would probably reflect a 
lower CET1 ratio. In conclusion, we expect a positive relationship between this 
independent variable and the dependent variable of our model.  
Size, measuring the banks’ size, is expressed by the natural logarithm of the 
banks’ asset. Klepczarek (2015) found that larger banks feel safer despite lower 
capital buffers, so they tend to have lower CET1 ratios. This is in line with the “Too 
big to fail” doctrine. Rime (2001) also finds a negative relationship between size 
and capital, large banks tend to increase their ratio of capital over RWAs less than 
others. According to previous literature, bank size is negatively related to capital 
(Ahmad et al., 2008; Jacques & Nigro, 1997; Gropp & Heider, 2008;  Brink & 
Arping, 2009; Bateni et al., 2014; Asarkaya & Ozcan, 2007). However, Das & 
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Ghosh (2004) found that bank size doesn’t have a significant impact on the ratio of 
capital over RWAs. Therefore, we expect that bank size is negatively related to 
CET1 ratio. 
RWA_TA represents the Risk-weighted assets ratio. It is calculated as RWAs 
over Total assets, this ratio is used as a proxy of risk indicator. We expect a negative 
relation between RWAs to total Assets and CET1 ratio. An increase in RWAs leads 
to a higher RWA over Total assets ratio and to a lower CET1 ratio, as this is 
calculated as CET1 capital over RWA. Literature also confirms that this 
explanatory variable negatively affects the CET1 ratio (See: Klepczarek, 2015; 
Brink & Arping, 2009; Das & Ghosh, 2004; Asarkaya & Ozcan, 2007). Nonetheless 
this is not consensual, Jacques & Nigro (1997) found that changes in RWAs to total 
assets have a positive relation with changes in capital ratios. Which also makes 
sense, taking into consideration the interpretation of such ratio. Banks with higher 
RWA to total assets have more risky assets, which require higher capital buffers. 
ROA expresses Return on Assets, which is a measure of profitability. This ratio 
is calculated as Net Income over Total assets. This variable tends to have a positive 
impact on capital. Rime (2001) found that ROA has a significant and positive impact 
on capital, concluding that profitable banks improve their capitalization through 
retained earnings. This statement is consistent with other studies (See: Das & 
Ghosh, 2004; and Bateni, et al., 2014). However, others found that ROA has no 
impact on capital since it is not statistically significant (Klepczarek, 2015).   
ROE represents Return on Equity, which is a measure of financial performance. 
This variable is commonly used as an alternative cost of capital, and it is calculated 
as Net Income over Equity. In previous literature, ROE shows a negative impact on 
capital (Bateni et al., 2014; and Asarkaya & Ozcan, 2007). Adversely, Brink & 
Arping (2009) found that ROE in a country perspective has a significant positive 
impact in Germany, and in a year by year perspective has a positive impact in 2005. 
Others found that ROE has no significant impact on banks’ capital ratios 
(Klepczarek, 2015).  
LiquidAss_Dep represents the liquidity available to the total of short-term 
deposits of the bank. This variable is expressed by the natural logarithm of the 
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coefficient between Liquid Assets and Deposits.  We expect that an increase in bank 
liquidity positively impacts banks’ capital ratios since investors would require 
higher rates of return on bank shares (Angbazo, 1997). Ahmad et al. (2008) found 
that the ratio of total liquid assets to total deposits has a positive impact on banks’ 
capital. Therefore, we expect that this variable has a positive correlation with the 
dependent variable.    
We included a dummy variable ECB to capture the quantitative easing effect 
on CET1 ratio. It is unity for observations after 2014 and zero otherwise.  
3.4 REGRESSION MODEL 
According to previous literature, firstly we define a panel data, and then, we 
carried out a regression analysis. We perform some tests to our independent 
variables in order to detect problems such as: multicollinearity, heteroskedastic and 
omitted variables. 
We formulate a regression model in accordance with past studies related to 
capital ratios. Our model expresses the CET1 ratio as function of a set of bank-
specific variables, as well as external variables. Thus, the generic regression model 
is written as follows: 
𝑪𝑬𝑻 𝟏 𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑸𝑻𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑾𝑨𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝒊𝒒𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑬𝑪𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
where 𝑪𝑬𝑻 𝟏 𝒊,𝒕 , CET1 ratio of bank i at time t; 𝑬𝑸𝑻𝑳𝑰,𝒕 , Total equity to total 
liabilities ratio of bank I at time t; 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕, represents the natural logarithm of total 
assets of bank i at time t; 𝑹𝑾𝑨𝒔𝒊,𝒕, ratio of total risk-weighted assets total assets of 
bank i at time t; 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕, return of assets of bank i at time t; 𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊,𝒕, return of equity of 
bank i at time t; 𝑳𝒊𝒒𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒊,𝒕, ratio of liquid assets over deposits of bank i at 
time t; 𝑬𝑪𝑩𝒊,𝒕 , a dummy variable: equals one for the period after 2014 and zero 
otherwise, in order to investigate the quantitative easing5 effect; and 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 is the error 
term.  
 
5 It consists to an unconventional monetary policy, where the ECB buy and sell securities from the banking 
system, influencing the level of reserves that banks hold in the system, leading to increases in their balance 
sheets (Joyce et al., 2012). 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
 18 
In our study we used five different models: Driscoll-Kraay regression, GLS 
regression, OLS regression, GLM and Arellano-Bond. We used a Driscoll-Kraay 
regression in order to correct heteroskedasticity problems. In this regression, the 
error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and possibly correlated between the 
panels (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). This regression can be used in both balanced and 
unbalanced panels and can handle missing values. 
   GLS is more efficient than OLS under heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation 
(Meliciani & Peracchi, 2006). This was the motivation for us to use GLS since our 
data have heteroscedasticity. Nonetheless, we also used OLS to see the results in 
our data. OLS relies on several assumptions: linearity, random sampling 
observations, conditional mean equal to zero, no multicollinearity, 
homoscedasticity, no autocorrelation and normality of errors (Williams et al, 2013). 
Our data has heteroskedasticity, and residuals are not normally distributed so this 
could not be a reliable model to run, justifying the usage of GLS. 
GLM is a generalization of ordinary linear regression that allows for dependent 
variables to have error distribution models other than normal.  
The Arellano-Bond estimator is a generalized method of moments estimator 
used in dynamic panel data models (Roodman, 2006). This estimator assumes that 
the dependent variable has a lag effect (Roodman, 2006). What happens in the 
independent variable only affects the dependent in the period after.   
3.4.1 PRELIMINARY STATISTICS  
After selecting our sample and variables, we treated the chosen variables for our 
model. In annex, Table VI presents the descriptive statistics, that summarizes the 
features of our data collection. We can check that our sample has 426 observations 
of the dependent variable, and that CET1 ratio mean is 19,09%. 
The maximum observed for CET1 ratio refers to KOMMUNINVEST I 
SVERIGE AB in 2017. This company is a Swedish local government funding 
agency. This observation (212 percent) is justified by the fact that this company’s 
scheme helps municipal governments to raise capital through the issuance of bonds. 
On the other hand, the minimum observed value for CET1 ratio is reported by 
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PANCRETAN COOPERATIVE BANK in 2013. This company is a Greek regional 
cooperative bank, providing retail banking products and services to local privates, 
self-employed professionals and SMEs. 
Regarding the minimum observed value for size variable reflects INBANK 
AS’s reported size of 2015. The maximum reflects CREDIT AGRICOLE’s 
reported size of 2011. INBANK AS was founded in 2015, which can explain the 
fact that it presents the minimum size of our sample. CREDIT AGRICOLE is one 
of the biggest banks in Europe, and in 2011 closed several agreements, e.g. the 
Carispezia acquisition. 
Concerning the RWA_TA variable, the minimum value is the percentual 
reported amount by WELLS FARGO BANK INTERNATIONAL in 2017.  The 
maximum reflects the amount reported by AEGEAN BALTIC BANK, a Greek 
credit institution, in 2016. The higher the Risk-weighted assets, the higher it will be 
the minimum amount of capital that must be held in order to reduce the risk of 
insolvency (Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision, 2011). 
The minimum of the variable EQTL reflects CZECH NATIONAL Banks’ bank 
leverage reported in 2017. The maximum refers to the EUROPEAN STABILITY 
MECHANISM’s amount in 2014. EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM is an 
international organisation that provides financial assistance to eurozone members 
whenever they are in financial difficulty. As referred in the previous section, low 
leveraged banks result in a higher ratio of EQTL, and high leveraged ones would 
have a lower EQTL ratio.  
For ROA, the minimum value belongs to the 2013 NOVA KREDITNA BANKA 
MARIBOR D.D. reported amount. The maximum amount reflects the return on 
assets of INBANK AS in 2017. 
The ROE’s minimum and the maximum observed value belong to 
ARBEJDSMARKEDETS TILLAEGSPENSION in 2018 and 2013, respectively. 
This is an investor of pension funds in Denmark. 
And lastly, the minimum observed for the ratio of the natural logarithm of 
Liquid assets over short-term deposits refers to the observation of GE CAPITAL 
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EUROPEAN FUNDING in 2018. This is an Irish company formed with the purpose 
of issuing debt securities to repay existing credit facilities, refinance indebtedness, 
and for acquisition purposes. Liquid assets to deposits maximum observed value 
belongs to WELLS FARGO BANK INTERNATIONAL (Ireland) in 2011. 
In annex, Table VII displays the correlation matrix of the variables used in our 
regression analysis.  
Following the previous section, where we put forward our beliefs with respect 
to the correlation between the dependent and the independent variables, Table VII 
shows the real correlation between them. 
As we can see, the size variable exhibits a negative relationship with the 
dependent variable. This is in accordance with previous literature (See: Klepczarek, 
2015; Ahmad et al., 2008; Bateni et al., 2014). 
RWA_TA also has a negative correlation with the dependent variable, meaning 
that an increase in RWAs variable will reflect a decrease in CET1 ratio. This 
responds to our expectations and is also in line with previous literature (Rime, 2001; 
Bateni et al., 2014). 
EQTL variable presents a positive correlation with CET1 ratio, pursuant to what 
we expected taking into consideration previous studies on capital ratios (Ahmad et 
al., 2008). 
It is observed that ROA has a positive correlation with the dependent variable. 
Although the impact of ROA in the CET1 ratio is not consensual in the literature, 
our results are in line with Bateni et al. (2014). 
ROE in our regression seems to be negatively correlated with CET1 ratio. Past 
studies also confirm that ROE shows a negative impact on capital (Asarkaya & 
Ozcan, 2007; Bateni et al., 2014). 
The ratio between Liquid Assets and Deposits presents a positive relationship 
with CET1 ratio. Which means that when the ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits 
increases, CET1 ratio tends to increase. That is aligned with our expectations 
presented in the previous section (Ahmad et al., 2008). 
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Regarding our dummy variable ECB, it has a positive impact on CET1 ratio. 
This means that quantitative easing6  implementation increased CET1 ratio.  A 
decrease of commercial banks’ assets, and therefore, of the denominator of CET1 
ratio, which makes the overall ratio to increase (all else being equal). 
3.5 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Performing a robustness analysis allows us to check if the results obtained stay 
the same given a change in inputs. Therefore, we replicate the model observing for 
the following effects: country, year, firm, random and fixed. Additionally, we 
correct ROE and CET1 ratio, submitting them to a winsor process.  
Winsorizing will allow us to limit extreme values in our data in order to reduce 
the effect of possible spurious outliers (Rousseeuw & Leroy, 1987). Our data is not 
normally distributed, and as we know distribution can be heavily influenced by 
outliers (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017). So, applying this transformation we can 
reduce the possibility of our data to be influenced by outliers. We only applied it to 
ROE and CET1 ratio because these variables had more extreme values. Winsorized 
estimators are usually more robust than the standard ones. Applying winsorization, 
our residuals seems to approximate more to a normal distribution, as you can see in 
kernel density graph (Figure 4 and 5). 
Table I exhibits the descriptive statistics taking into consideration the 








6 ECB’s measure of buying assets from commercial banks, as part of its monetary policy measures, 
supporting economic growth 
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Table I - Descriptive statistics (Robustness check) 
Variable Observations Mean Std deviation Min  Max 
CET1 Ratio_w 429 .184711 .1272641 .055 .8026 
Size 863 23.80273 2.216189 17.56087 28.26205 
RWA_TA 516 .4502035 .2364921 .0007195 1.083926 
EQTL 863 .1472523 .8029398 -.0541251 14.21628 
ROA 871 .0027281 .013841 -.1352 .0711 
ROE_w 865 .0656516 .2613421 -1.1493 1.3367 
LiquidAss_Dep 866 -1.045432 1.590327 -9.21034 12.02304 
ECB 1,096 .625 .4843439 0 1 
In Table I the variables signalized with “_w” are the ones that were submitted 
to winsorization.  
The correlation between the dependent and independent variables is close to our 
model with the standard variables (Table VIII).   
In addition to winsorization, we also performed different regressions. The 
objective is to reinforce the conclusions obtained, because findings based on a 
single method may distort the results. Thus, the application of several methods to 
address our research question will strengthen the results.  
4. RESULTS  
This chapter exhibit and discuss the results. Section 4.1 displays the results 
arising from our determinants’ estimation of the CET1 ratio. Section 4.2 presents 
the robustness analysis results. 
4.1 DETERMINANTS OF CET1 RATIO 
What were the determinants of CET1 ratio in European Union banks after the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis? 
In order to answer our research question, we assess the determinants of the 
CET1 ratio and present the results in Table II.  
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As we can observe, with an exception for Model 4 and 7, size presents a 
significant and negative impact in CET1 ratio. Large banks appear to have a lower 
CET1 ratio. For the two regressions in Model 4 and 7, size does not impact the 
CET1 ratio and has a positive coefficient, which is the opposite of what we 
expected. Larger banks tend to increase their capital ratios more than other banks 
(Rime, 2001). 
 In all Models, the RWA_TA is negatively related to CET1 ratio. This was 
already verified in previous literature (See, for example: Klepczarek, 2015; Brink 
& Arping, 2009). The correlation between risk and capital is often negative due to 
the difference in risk perception. The assets that a regulator classifies as a high level 
of risk are not considered as risky by managers (Wong et al, 2008). Thus, since our 
Models shows that RWA_TA negatively affects the CET1 ratio, it confirms the 
difference in risk perception within regulatory authorities and managers.  
The results are consistent in all Models regarding EQTL. This variable presents 
a positive correlation with the CET1 ratio. As seen in previous literature, low 
leverage banks would have a higher CET1 ratio (Ahmad et al, 2008).  
ROA and ROE don’t have a significant impact on CET1 ratio. Nonetheless, their 
coefficients sign are in line with previous literature and with our expectations (See 
Klepczarek, 2015; Bateni et al, 2014). 
In relation to the ratio of Liquid assets over deposits, we observe in Models 4, 
6, 7 and 10 that it has a significant and positive correlation with the CET1 ratio. As 
we expected, banks with more liquidity appear to have a higher CET1 ratio (Ahmad 
et al, 2008). 
The Quantitative Easing effect, that we express by ECB, appears to have a 
positive and statistical significance in all models except in Model 10. Model 10 
represents an Arellano–Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, where it is 
considered the lag effect of the dependent variable. In other words, what happens 
in the independent variable only impacts the dependent one period after. Therefore, 
the Quantitative Easing effect of, for example, 2010 do not influence 2011’s CET1 
ratio. 
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size -0.0184*** -0.0184*** -0.0140*** 0.0414 -0.0184*** -0.0110*** 0.0414 -0.0123** -0.0184*** -0.1144*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0012) (0.0252) (0.0045) (0.0012) (0.0884) (0.0049) (0.0039) (0.0375) 
RWA_TA -0.5785*** -0.5763*** -0.5635*** -0.3927** -0.5785*** -0.3879*** -0.3927*** -0.5259*** -0.5785*** -0.7590*** 
 (0.0923) (0.0961) (0.0985) (0.1447) (0.0923) (0.0182) (0.1206) (0.1199) (0.0691) (0.2069) 
EQTL 1.0042*** 0.9923*** 0.9495*** 1.2030*** 1.0042*** 0.9096*** 1.2030** 0.9171*** 1.0042*** 1.1371** 
 (0.0825) (0.0815) (0.0778) (0.1835) (0.0825) (0.0637) (0.5780) (0.2111) (0.1385) (0.5152) 
ROA 0.7430 0.6128 2.6459 5.4229 0.7430 0.1344 5.4229 3.9231 0.7430 0.4259 
 (0.8865) (0.8800) (2.5964) (3.1052) (0.8865) (0.4695) (4.9586) (3.4366) (1.0399) (0.8904) 
ROE -0.1527 -0.1494 -0.2782 -0.4761 -0.1527 -0.0404 -0.4761 -0.3781 -0.1527 -0.0027 
 (0.1273) (0.1310) (0.2441) (0.2677) (0.1273) (0.0453) (0.4409) (0.3176) (0.0945) (0.0663) 
LiquidAss_Dep 0.0257 0.0248 0.0369 0.0383* 0.0257 0.0097*** 0.0383* 0.0192 0.0257 0.0166** 
 (0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0212) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0021) (0.0216) (0.0244) (0.0160) (0.0065) 
ECB 0.0356***  0.0455** 0.0404** 0.0356*** 0.0183*** 0.0404*  0.0356*** 0.0339 
 (0.0097)  (0.0151) (0.0165) (0.0097) (0.0056) (0.0213)  (0.0110) (0.0224) 
CET1_Ratio = L,          0.4097*** 
          (0.0578) 
Constant 0.8012*** 0.8080*** 0.6819*** -0.8130 0.8012*** 0.5204*** -0.7114 0.6250*** 0.8012*** 3.0690*** 
 (0.1642) (0.1704) (0.0563) (0.6222) (0.1642) (0.0364) (2.1458) (0.1624) (0.1319) (0.9385) 
Year Effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Country Effects No No Yes No Yes No No No No No 
Firm Effects No No No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Wald Test - - - - - - FE - - - 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 246 
R-squared 0.3583 0.3647 0.4175 0.6831 0.3583  0.1988    
Number of groups 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77   
Number of id          68 
Note: This table presents the results of the determinants of CET1 Ratio. Model 1 refers to a regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Model 2 is a regression with 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with year effects, while Model 3 is with country effects, Model 4 with firm effects, and Model 5 with year, country and firm effects. 
Model 6 is based on a GLS regression. Model 7 and 8 are OLS regressions with fixed effects and year effects, respectively. Model 9 is a generalised linear model. 
Model 10 is an Arellano–Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS= ordinary least squares; GLM= generalized linear 
model; GLS= generalized least squares  
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4.2 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Table III exposes the results obtained replicating the models used and applying 
a winsorized process to CET1 ratio and ROE. We decide to do this transformation 
in these two variables given their discrepancy of minimum and maximum values. 
Despite these values were justified by the nature business of the entities that have 
such values, they are far from what is normal in our sample. Thus, we applied the 
winsorized process to these variables, in order to limit extreme values (Rousseeuw 
& Leroy, 1987). The robustness analysis strengthens the results that we came with. 
Results achieved with such transformations are similar to the results presented 
previously.  
Size has a significant and negative correlation with CET1 ratio in all Models, 
except for Model 4 and 7, just like it had without winsorizing ROE and CET1 ratio. 
The difference is that with this transformation, in model 4 and 7 the coefficient is 
negative. 
The results in RWA_TA, EQTL and ROA are consistent since they are the same 
with and without winsorizing. RWA_TA is significant and influences negatively the 
CET1 ratio. EQTL also remains significant and positively impacts the CET1 ratio. 
While ROA still has a positive coefficient but doesn’t impact the CET1 ratio. 
ROE, which was submitted to winsorization, is now significant in Models 6 and 
9. Meaning that in Models 6 and 9 ROE does have a significant and negative impact 
in CET1 ratio. Regarding the rest of the Models, the results are consistent with the 
ones reported before. 
Regarding the ratio between Liquid assets and deposits, the results are similar. 
In this hypothesis, it is significant and has a positive impact on the dependent 
variable in Model 3, in addition to Models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10. Thus, it appears that 
now, LiquidAss_Dep has a positive and significant relationship with the CET1 ratio 
taking into consideration country effects.  
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
26 
 
































Size -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0186*** -0.0079 -0.0172 -0.0109*** -0.0079 -0.0096* -0.0149*** -0.0886*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0138) (0.0174) (0.0009) (0.0480) (0.0050) (0.0025) (0.0315) 
RWA_TA -0.5340*** -0.5330*** -0.5106*** -0.4101*** -0.3905*** -0.4092*** -0.4101*** -0.4264*** -0.5340*** -0.6105*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0713) (0.0734) (0.1030) (0.0990) (0.0148) (0.1014) (0.0831) (0.0551) (0.1156) 
EQTL 1.0327*** 1.0254*** 0.9385*** 0.9370*** 0.8185*** 0.9364*** 0.9370** 0.8526*** 1.0327*** 0.8342*** 
 (0.0594) (0.0605) (0.0724) (0.1032) (0.1019) (0.0526) (0.3735) (0.2624) (0.1327) (0.2188) 
ROA 0.6166 0.5821 1.2972 1.7317 1.7004 0.2749 1.7317 1.7528 0.6166 0.1982 
 (0.7550) (0.7454) (1.7146) (1.1137) (1.0973) (0.3638) (1.6966) (1.5708) (0.7680) (0.4922) 
ROE_w -0.1311 -0.1327 -0.1650 -0.1709 -0.1713 -0.0613* -0.1709 -0.1814 -0.1311* -0.0078 
 (0.1058) (0.1081) (0.1757) (0.0977) (0.0992) (0.0369) (0.1768) (0.1638) (0.0770) (0.0524) 
LiquidAss_Dep 0.0094 0.0090 0.0159* 0.0230** 0.0185* 0.0041*** 0.0230** 0.0101 0.0094 0.0163*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0014) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0081) (0.0063) 
ECB 0.0279***  0.0315*** 0.0281** 0.0188*** 0.0156*** 0.0281**  0.0279*** 0.0240** 
 (0.0063)  (0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0123)  (0.0080) (0.0110) 
CET1_Ratio_w = L,          0.3501** 
          (0.1455) 
Constant 0.6743*** 0.6798*** 0.7489*** 0.4181 0.6924 0.5211*** 0.4786 0.5087*** 0.6743*** 2.4304*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0808) (0.0876) (0.3387) (0.4769) (0.0280) (1.1726) (0.1401) (0.0777) (0.7881) 
Year Effects No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Country Effects No No Yes No Yes No No No No No 
Firm Effects No No No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Wald Test - - - - - - FE - - - 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 246 
R-squared 0.5025 0.5070 0.5651 0.8690 0.8726  0.3579    
Number of groups 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77   
Number of id          68 
Note: This table presents the results of the determinants of CET1 Ratio. Model 1 refers to a regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Model 2 is a regression with 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with year effects, while Model 3 is with country effects, Model 4 with firm effects, and Model 5 with year, country and firm effects. 
Model 6 is based on a GLS regression. Model 7 and 8 are OLS regressions with fixed effects and year effects, respectively. Model 9 is a generalised linear model. 
Model 10 is an Arellano–Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS= ordinary least squares; GLM= generalized linear 
model; GLS= generalized least squares  
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In Table III we observe that ECB is positive and statistically significant in every 
Model. With the winsorization process, the effect caused by the Quantitative Easing 
in period 0 will affect the CET1 ratio in period 1. 
The robust analysis results confirm the results and strengthen the conclusions 
reached.  
5. CONCLUSION  
This work aims to identify the determinants of the CET1 ratio of European 
banks between 2011 and 2018. Our results are mainly aligned with existing 
literature.  
We found that larger banks have lower CET1 ratio. This is in line with the “Too 
big to fail” doctrine. Larger banks feel safer, so they don’t feel the need to have 
capital buffers (Klepczarek, 2015).  
Riskier banks have a lower CET1 ratio (Das & Ghosh, 2004; Asarkaya & 
Ozcan, 2007). This can be justified by looking at the formulas of both ratios. The 
ratio to measure risk is calculated as RWAs over Total Assets, and the CET1 ratio 
is calculated as CET1 capital over RWA. Increasing the RWAs, and consequently 
the banks’ risk, we are simultaneously decreasing the CET1 ratio. In our study, we 
verified that variable RWA_TA negatively correlates with the CET1 ratio. 
We have evidence to conclude that banks with a lower ratio of total equity to 
liabilities have a lower CET1 ratio. High leverage banks would hold less equity 
since they face difficulties in raising equity, so their CET1 ratio would be lower 
(Ahmad et al., 2008).   
We also found that banks with more liquidity are more solvents. Liquidity has 
a positive impact on banks’ capital ratios (Angbazo, 1997; Ahmad et al., 2008). 
Higher liquid banks have an easier ability to transfer hard assets into cash, so they 
have more ease to money assess. In case of a crisis they would be in advance. 
Additionally, the measure held by ECB to purchase financial assets appears to 
increase the banks’ capacity to absorb potential losses, since it has a positive impact 
in CET1 ratio. 
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The present paper contributes to the already existing literature. Nonetheless, 
further research on this topic needs to be undertaken, given the subject’s 
importance.  
Our study limitation regards mainly the data used. Due to unavailable data we 
could not use a larger period, which would be much more interesting. We had 
constraints in the period used and the data available by bank. With a larger period, 
we could address better the Sovereign Debt Crisis effects. Results would have been 
more robust if we had the same data available for all the banks in our sample. We 
did not have the same number of observations by banks. If we had used only quoted 
banks in our study, we might not have such problems, but by doing that selection, 
we would be biased our sample. Choosing only quoted banks would result in a 
sample composed only by banks with the greatest importance in the financial 
system. 
Future researchers should use larger samples to robust their results, in order to 
overcome the problem of unavailable data. It would also be interesting to use a 
wider timeframe. This will only be possible when there is a database with extensive 
financial information about all banks, and not only about the quoted ones.  
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Country/Region Period Methodology Dep. Variable Ind. Variables Main Conclusions 
Ahmad et al 
(2008) 







NPL to Total loans; 
Risk index; 
Size; 
Net interest margin; 
Total equity to total liabilities; 
Total liquid asset to total deposit; 
Dummy equals 1 for low capitalized banks; 
Dummy equals 1 for period 1999-2002; 
Dummy equals 1 for year 1996 
Strong positive relationship between 
regulatory capital and bank 
management’s risk-taking behaviour. 
Regulators’ risk-based capital 
standards didn’t impact regulatory 
capital adjustment by low-capitalized 
banks. 
Bank capital decisions are not driven 









CET1 ratio Size; 
ROA (profitability); 
ROE; 
Competitive pressure (average country CAR 1 
ratio); 
Share of deposits in non-equity liabilities; 
RWA/Total Assets; 
Loans/Total Assets; 
Average country inflation rate 
Bank size and the risk indicators have 
impact on banks’ capital adequacy. 
There is a strong effect of competitive 
pressure, and a negative correlation 
between CET1 ratio and the share of 
deposits in non-equity liabilities. 
 
Gropp et al 
(2008) 
USA and 15 EU 
members 
1991-2004 Addresses the 
capital structure 
of banks from 
the perspective 
of empirical 
capital structure   





Dummy for dividend payers 
Banks appear to have stable capital 
structures at levels that are specific to 
each individual bank. Capital 
requirements are second-order 
importance for banks’ capital 
structures. 


















Buffer (Regulatory capital ratio minus minimum 




Basel II (Dummy equals 1 if Basel II is 
adopted); 
IRB (Dummy equals 1 if bank has adopted 
internal ratings-based approach); 
Standardized (Dummy variable equals 1 if bank 
adopted the standardized approach); 
Shadow banking (Total value of securitized 
assets over total GDP (%)); 
Capital regulation (index); 
Regulatory strength (index); 
GDP growth  
RWAs are ill calibrated to a market 
measure of bank portfolio risk. This 
low-risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements allows banks to build up 
capital buffers by underreporting their 
portfolio risk and undermines banks’ 
ability to withstand adverse shocks. 
Risk sensitivity of capital requirements 
is higher for banks that have adopted 












ratios in a cross-
country 
perspective 





Cost of capital- Net Income/Average 
Equity*100; 
Loan ratio- Loans/Total Assets*100; 
OBS ratio: On balance sheet items/Total 
assets*100; 
Asset growth; 
Bank sentiment: Bank share index minus Total 
market index (%); 
Trend; 
Dummy capitalisation: 1 if RACR < median, 0 
otherwise 
Bank-specific characteristics and the 
degree of undercapitalization are 
relevant for bank capital ratios.  
Capital regulation seems to be effective 
in influencing bank capital ratios. 
 
7 Vallascas et al (2013) defined the variable Deposits as the ratio of customer deposits over total liabilities, and it is a variable with a significant and positive impact 
on RWAs to total assets ratio 



















Log (1-MCAP8)- log 
leverage 
Equity return index; 
Short-term bill return series; 
Long-term bond return series; 
Cash reserves to Total assets; 
Loans to Total assets; 
Size; 
National bank indicator; 
Trust company indicator; 
Bank holding company indicator; 
Charter value measure; 
Interaction variable (charter value 
measure*equity return index) 
During economic expansions, bank 
charter values increase, reflecting 
growth opportunities. There is a 
positive relationship between charter 
value and capital ratios during 
expansions.  
The charter value and bank leverage 
relationship are sensitive to market 
conditions. 
Rime (2001) Switzerland 1989-1995 Assess whether 
and how Swiss 
banks react to 
constraints 





Change in capital 
ratios 
Change in risk levels 




Current loan losses; 
REG (Dummy equals one if banks’ capital ratio 
is within 1 s.d. of the minimum capital 
requirement); 
Capital to Total assets; 
Capital to RWA; 
RWA to Total assets 
Swiss banks close to the minimum 
regulatory capital requirements tend to 
increase their ratio of capital to RWAs, 
which indicated that regulatory 
pressure induces banks to increase their 
capital. Regulatory pressure has no 







2002-2008 Assesses the 
link between 





Tier 1 capital ratio Interest coverage ratio; 
ROE; 
Net interest margin; 
Size; 
Total Liabilities to Total Assets (capital 
structure); 
RWA to Total Assets (asset structure) 
For almost each country and year a 
banks’ size, asset and capital structure 
are negatively related to its Tier 1 
capital ratio.  
 
8 MCAP stands for banks’ Market Capital Ratio 
9 G10 is composed by USA, UK, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden 





USA 1990-1991 Examines the 
risk-based 
capital impact 



















Change in risk levels 
Size; 
BHC (Dummy equals to one for banks 
belonging to a multibank holding company); 
LEVD (Dummy equals to one for banks with 
less than 5% leverage ratio); 
Cap 10period before; 
Change in RWAs to Total assets; 
Income to Total assets; 




BHC (Dummy equals to one for banks 
belonging to a multibank holding company); 
LEVD (Dummy equals to one for banks with 
less than 5% leverage ratio); 
RWAs to Total Assets period before; 
Change in Cap; 
Regulatory pressure variables (RPL and RPG); 
Risk-based capital standards were 
effective in increasing capital ratios 
and reducing portfolio risk in 
commercial banks. 
Bateni et al 
(2014) 








Total loans to Total assets; 
ROE; 
Total deposits to Total assets; 
Total deposits to Total assets; 
RWAs to Total Assets; 
ROA; 
Total Equity to Total Assets 
Capital adequacy ratios is adversely 
affected by banks’ size. 
RWAs to Total assets and Total 
deposits to Total assets have no impact 












RWAs to Total assets; 
ROE; 
Share of deposits in non-equity liabilities; 
GDP (quarterly); 
Average capital adequacy ratio of the sector; 
Size 
Portfolio risk, economic growth, 
average capital level of the sector and 
return on equity are positively 
correlated with capital adequacy ratio. 
Share of deposits are negatively 
correlated with capital adequacy ratio. 
 
10 Defined as the ratio of total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) to Total RWAs 
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Ediz et al 
(1998) 
UK 1989-1995 Impact of bank 
capital 
requirements on 




Tier 1 capital ratio 
Tier 2 capital ratio 
Change in trigger dummy (equals 1 if the bank 
has experienced an upward adjustment in its 
trigger ratio in the previous 3 quarters); 
Fee income to Net interest income; 
Net interest income to Total RWAs; 
Deposits to Total RWAs; 
RAR trigger less than 1 s.d (equals 1 if RAR is 
less than one bank-specific standard deviation 
above the banks’ trigger); 
Off-balance sheet assets to Total RWAs; 
Profit and loss to Total RWAs; 
Total provisions; 
100 percent weighted assets to Total RWAs; 
Lagged dependent variable 
Capital requirements seem to affect 
bank behaviour over and above the 
influence of the banks’ own internally 
generated capital targets. 
Capital requirements appear to be an 
attractive regulatory instrument, since 




27 banks in India 1996-2001 Investigates the 
link between 














Change in risk levels 
Intercept; 
Size; 
REG (Dummy equals one if banks’ capital is at 
least equal to the regulatory minimum); 
Cap12 period before; 
Cap*REG; 
Change in Non-performing assets; 





REG (Dummy equals one for banks with total 
capital ratios below 8%); 
Risk period before; 
Change Cap; 
Change in Non-performing assets; 
Large banks increased their ratio of 
capital to RWAs less than other banks. 
Regulatory pressure has negative and 
significant impact on the ratio of 
capital to RWAs. 
Risk exposure and capital levels are 
related, most of banks mitigate the 
effects of increases in capital by 
decreasing asset risk posture.   
 
11 SUR stands for Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
12 Ghosh & Das (2004) defines Cap as Capital to Total RWAs 
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Studies Conclusions regarding this variable 
Size Ahmad et al (2008) 
 
 










Jacques & Nigro (1997) 
 
 
Gropp et al (2008) 
 
Brink & Arping (2009) 
 
 
Ghosh & Das (2004) 
 
 
Bateni et al (2014) 
 
Asarkaya et al (2007) 
Negative relationship between size and capital, so large banks face less pressure to raise capital. However, under FGLS 
bank size is not a determinant of bank capital. 
 
Size doesn’t have a significant impact on the ratio of RWA to Total Assets. 
 
Bank size and CET1 ratio are negatively correlated. Larger banks feel safer despite their lower capital buffers (Too big to 
fail doctrine). 
 
Bank size is positively related to leverage. 
 
Size has a negative and significant impact on capital (defined as Capital to total assets and capital to RWAs), large banks 
increase their ratio of capital to RWA less than others. This variable has a positive impact on the ratio of RWA to total 
assets. 
 
Bank size is inversely related to changes in Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital to RWAs ratio, and has a positive impact in RWAs to 
total assets ratio. 
 
Size has a significant and negative impact on regulatory tier 1 capital ratio, smaller banks have more Tier 1 capital. 
 
In a country by country perspective, size has a negative relation with Tier 1, with exception for Germany. In a year by year 
perspective, size has a negative relation with the dependent variable except for 2008.  
 
Size has no significant impact on the ratio of capital to RWAs, but it has a significant and positive impact on RWAs to 
total assets ratio. 
 
Size is negatively related with capital adequacy ratio. 
 
Size has a significant negative relationship with capital adequacy ratio.  
Total Equity to Total 
Liabilities 
Ahmad et al (2008) 
 
Positive relationship between bank leverage and the risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio.  
Liquid Assets/Deposits Ahmad et al (2008) The ratio of total liquid asset assets to total deposits has a positive impact on bank capital.  
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Brink & Arping (2009) 
 
 
Ghosh & Das (2004) 
 
 
Bateni et al (2014) 
 
Asarkaya et al (2007) 
RWAs to total assets ratio negatively affects CET1 ratio, confirming the difference in the risk perception within the 
regulatory authorities and the managers. 
 
The changes of this variable have a significant and positive relationship with the changes in capital to total assets ratio, and 
a non-significant relationship with RWAs to total assets ratio. 
 
With Risk-based capital ratio constraints, both lagged RWAs to total assets ratio and changes in RWAs to total assets ratio 
are significant to changes in Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital to RWAs ratio and changes in RWAs to total assets ratio, 
respectively. The lagged RWAs to total assets ratio has a negative relation with changes in RWAs to total assets ratio. 
Changes in RWAs to total assets have a positive relation with changes in Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital to RWAs ratio. 
 
In a country perspective RWA to total assets negatively impact Tier 1 ratio, with exception for Sweden. In a year 
perspective it always has a negative impact. 
 
The change in RWA to Total assets, using the SUR estimates, has a significant negative impact in capital to RWAs, 
although, using 2SLS estimates it is not statistically significant. 
 
The ratio of RWAs to total assets do not have any impact on capital adequacy ratio. 
 
RWAs to total assets is negatively and significantly correlated with capital adequacy ratio. 








Ghosh & Das (2004) 
 
Bateni et al (2014) 
ROA is statistically significant and has a positive relationship with the ratio of RWA to Total Assets. Profitable banks 
have less incentives to engage in capital arbitrage by reporting lower RWA to Total Assets ratios. 
 
ROA is not statistically significant. 
 
ROA has a significant and positive impact on capital (defined as Capital to total assets and capital to RWAs). Profitable 
banks improve their capitalization through retained earnings. 
 
ROA has a significant and positive impact on capital to total RWAs ratio. 
 
ROA has a significant and positive relationship with capital adequacy ratios. 
 
ROE Klepczarek (2015) 
 
Brink & Arping (2009) 
 
 
Bateni et al (2014) 
 
Asarkaya et al (2007) 
ROE is not statistically significant and shows a very low positive sign coefficient. 
 
In a country perspective, ROE has a significant positive impact on Tier 1 ratio only in Germany. Regarding a year by year 
analysis, ROE has a significant positive impact only in 2005. The higher the ROE, the more value a bank creates. 
 
ROE has a significant and negative impact in banks’ capital adequacy ratio. 
 
ROE has a significant and negative impact when instruments started with lag 3. 
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Table VI - Descriptive statistics Table VII - Correlation matrix 
 







Table VIII - Correlation matrix (Robustness check) 
 
Figure 2- Shapiro-Wilk test output 
Vanessa M. Toscano  Determinants of bank capital ratios in EU banks 
41 
 
Figure 3- Kernel density graph 
 
Figure 4- Standardized normal 
probability plot (Robustness check) 
Figure 5- Kernel density graph (Robustness 
check) 
Figure 6- Residuals histogram (Robustness 
check)  
Figure 7- Dependent variable's 
Histogram                                       
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0242
Kernel density estimate
